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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY J. XANTHOS, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-> 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF OPPOSING 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 18333 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal originated from a final judgment from the Third 
Judicial District Court, Judge Kenneth Rigtiup presiding. The 
district courts conducted a trial de novo on Respondent's request 
for, plenary relief from a Board of Adjustment's decision declin-
ing to ,grant a variance, for the continuance of a nonconforming 
building.~·The district court,.after reweighing the evidence 
before the Board together ·over objection with evidence not 
before the Board, reversed the· Board and,·granted the desired 
variance. The Respondent or "Board" appealed. 
After briefing, argument, and deliberation, this Court 
issued its written opinion on May 1, 1984 reversing the district 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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court on the law and after applying that law to the facts, 
reversed and reinstated the Board's decision. 
The Respondent now seeks the Court to reconsider its deci-
sion, not facially on the law, but on its application of the law 
to the record. The Board opposes that motion and moves the Court 
to deny the petition for rehearing. 
PREVIOUS DISPOSITION BY THIS COURT 
On May 1, 184, this Court handed down its written decision 
in the above-entitled matter after full briefing, argument, 
debate, and consideration by the Court. That opinion had two 
major elements: (1) the establishment of the applicable 
standard of review and procedures governing judicial review of a 
Board of Adjustment decision under Section 10-9-15, Utah Code 
Ann., and (2) the application of those standards to the 
particular facts in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the 
district court on both elements because it had improperly assumed 
the powers to conduct a trial de novo on the facts. It assumed 
all powers of the Board by reweighing the facts according to its 
own values and felt at liberty to substitute its own judgment and 
priority of public policy. 
The principles of the standard of review clearly established 
for district courts to follow in Board of Adjustment cases 
arising under said Section 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. seeking 
"plenary action for relief" clearly include: 
-2-
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(1) Board decisions like those other zoning 
administrative bodies "should be allowed a comparatively wide 
!attitude of discretion": and 
(2) "their actions are endowed with a presumption of 
correctness- and validity": which 
(3) "the courts should not interfere with unless it is 
shown that there is no reasonable bas is to j_ustify the act ion 
taken. n 1 
(4) "The judicial review is not to he a retrial on the 
merits" 2 or reweigh the evidence and the court is not allowed 
to substitute its-judgment for that of Board." 
(5) .r::.: "The· role of the district court in reviewing· the 
Board of Adjustment's decision is to determine whet_J:ier the 
action taken was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary ,or capri-
cious. In order to make that·' determination, the district 
court may take additional evidence, but. it must be related to 
the issues that were raised and considered by the-Board. 113 
Having -clarified the- law, which had not ... been respect~d- in 
this case by the district court that_conducted a trial de novo 
1 Page 3 -of Supreme Court• s Decis:ion -of May 1, 1984 i_n --the abqve 
case, hereinafter "Deci-sion of May 1 , 1984" 1 ci-ting--Cottonwood 
Heights Citizens Ass'n·--v. Board of Commissioners, 59-3. P.2d 138, 
140 (1979). 
2necision of May 1, 1984 at page 3. 
3Id. 
-3-
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and assumed the power of the Board to reweigh policy and the 
facts, the Supreme Court properly proceeded to apply the correct 
law to the record. 
The Court correctly perceived that the district court had 
asserted its own individual judgment prioritizing the retention 
of low income housing regardless of zoning considerations. In 
doing so it had erred, and that error could and was properly 
corrected by the Supreme Court looking to see if there was a 
reasonable basis for the Board's decision. The Court noted that 
perhaps evidence in the record could have supported the district 
court•s,decision, had it had the authority to reweigh and balance 
according to its own values. But the court held it was not the 
court's prer~gative to weigh the evidence anew~ 
"However it does not matter whether the judge agrees or 
disagrees with the rationale -of the Board or the-, policy -
grounds upon which a decision is based.· It does not lie 
within the prerogative of the trial court to substitue 
its judgment for that of the.Board where the record -dis-
closes a reasonable basis for the Board's decision." 
Id. at page 6. 
Having the record before it as issue in controversy, the 
supreme Court applied the correct law in its review. It found 
"the record in this case clearly reflects, that the Board of 
Adjustments action was not arbitrary or capricious and that there 
was a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it." 
The dissenting opinion disagreed, not with the Court's 
statement of the law, but with the application of the law to the 
facts. The dissenting opinion's main thesis that the majority 
-4-
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opinion erred in its perception of the facts by giving greater 
deference to the Board's decision than it did to the district 
court. The dissent gave and argued the Court should give 
deference to .. findings cited by the district court, but failed to 
address the tainting impact of the district court's error in 
substituting its judgment and values upon its findings. In 
reliance on the district court's findings, the dissent would have 
estopped the Board from enforcing the zoning ordinances. 
DECISION SOUGHT.ON REHEARING 
Respondent, in effect, desires the majority to adopt the 
dissenting opinion. Appellant asks the ~<;>_urt to dismis~, the-
Respondent's Petition and affirm its decision of May 1, 1984 in 
all re·spects. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. I. 
-THE COURT; DID NOT ERR IN ITS DECISION OF MAY 1, 
1984 AND SHOULD DENY RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
REHEARING. 
A. RESPONDENT'S PETITION MERELY REARGUES ITS CASE 
AND THE DISSENTING OPINION. 
The ·argume-nts raised.,· by Respondent were briefed, argued .and 
specifically considered by the Court in the opinions of the 
decision of May 1, 1984. In support of Respondent's motion,·for 
rehearing, Respondent urges that· the Supreme- Court erred, when in 
applying the law to the facts of this case,- -it found that there 
was ample evidence in the record to support the Board of 
-5-
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Adjustment's decision and thus was not arbitrary nor capricious. 
Respondent suggests that because there is evidence in the 
record as reweighed by the district court to support the latter's 
decision, that the Supreme Court is precluded from reversing for 
it must give deference to the district court findings under the 
traditiona~ doctrine of limited appellate review. That issue and 
Respondent's position is not new, it is merely reargument. 4 It 
is the thesis of the dissenting opinion5 and is one which this 
prevailing opinion specifically considered and rejected when it 
determined the scope of judicial review is to refrain from 
substituting "its judgment for that of the Board where the record 
discloses a reasonable basis for the Board's decision. 116 
This holding of law conforms to the well reasoned law of 
similar cases and should be affirmed. The holding was adopted 
after complete briefing, argument and consideration but disagree-
ment in a strong dissent. It is a holding with which it can be 
expected the Respondent as a defeated party, together with the 
dissenting author, would not agree. But in accordance with the 
long-established and worthy poli~y of this court, mere 
disagreement does not provide an appropriate ground to justify a 
4Respondent's Brief Points I{D) and II, Appellant's Brief, Point 
I and {C) in particular. 
Soecision of May 1, 1984, dissent at page 9. 
6ra., majority opinion at p. 4. 
-6-
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rehearing • Duchene au v. House , 4 U. 2 9 2 , 9 P • 6 1 8 , ( 18 8 6 ) , Jones 
v. House, 4 U. 484, 9 P. 619 (1886); Cunnington v. Scott,~ U.~, 
9 P. 619 (1886). 
B. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DECLINED TO 
EXTEND A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY TO THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S FINDINGS, BUT REVIEWED THEM MERELY FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING THE EXISTENCE OF SUP-
PORT FOR THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT. 
Respondent and the dissenting opinion suggest the Supreme 
Court erred in failing to give proper deference to the district 
court's findings. As discussed generall~7 ~hove, that issue is 
not new, was briefed, argued, and unsuc9essfully raised in the 
dissent and rejected. 7 
Respondent now_ further suggests th~t after conducting the 
trial as a matter of original jurisdiction and substitut_ing, its 
own values prioritizing low cost housing over other _valid zoning 
objectives, the district __ court also concluded that the Board_' s 
decision was arbitrary and capricious, that the latter statement 
can be extracted from {its setting untainted by the district :c 
court's fundamental errors. 
The Court properly discerned that candici. refusal of the 
district court to extend a presumption of validity tq J:he Board's 
decision and correspondingly limit its scope of judicial review 
inherently tainted the- entirety of its actions, precluding the 
7Appellant's Brief, Point I & (C) in particular, Respondent's 
Brief, Point I(D) and II, argument, .and .. t_he dissenting_,opinion. 
-7-
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Supreme Court from deferring to or relying on the district 
court's findings and conclusions. 8 When such error and abuse of 
judicial power occurs, the matter must be remedied by Supreme 
Court intervention. Otherwise, the error becomes perpetuated and 
insulated; the primary safeguard of judicial restraint becomes 
meaningless, and the district courts become super boards of 
adjustment. 
The tainting error of a district court's failure to apply 
the appropriate limited scope of review cannot be expunged by 
asking if there is evidence to support the erroneous decision, 
but to properlv review the evidence in the favor of the Board. 
This Court proper! .. ,, fulfilled its duty by conducting the 
review under the scope of analysis that should have been applied 
at the district court level. Was there a reasonable basis for 
the Board's action~? This Cour~ did not substitute its judgment 
for that of the discretion of the trial court for the discretion 
is not vested in the district court but in the Board. There is 
nothing to suggest how this court or individual justices might 
have voted had they been members of the Board, and they carefully 
declined to give that appearance. Obviously this was and remains 
a case over which reasonable parties could and do disagree. 
In reversing on the facts, the Court correctly cured the 
errors in the same manner as courts reaching the same conclusion 
8oecision of May 1, 1984 at page 4. 
-8-
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in other similar matters have done and should do. Rickard v. 
Fundenberger, 1 Kan App. 2nd 222, 563 P.2d 1069 (1977). 
C. THE- RECORD SUPPORTS A REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE 
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DECISION. THE COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN ITS ANALYSIS OF THE RECORD. 
The issue as to whether the record provides a reasonable 
basis to support the Board decision -when analyzed from the 
correct scope of judicial review has been °in controversy in every 
phase of this appeal--in briefing, argument and opinions. People. 
disagree, but the court, after careful:~ consideration, has found. 
the "record clear1y·'reflects119 there· was a reasonable basis and 
has·· ruled in the Board's favor.; That- ruling should be aff i-rmed 
without reservation or further rehearing. 
· -R:~spondent cites a series of a selected few of;-; the Supreme 
Court•s·statements t:hat it'believes are not-consistent with the 
record; but in actualfty are only-inconsistent~with its Il1YOpic 
percep.tion of· tho·se facts~ Individ-ually- -and collectiv-ely· _,the 
-discrepancies are·' non 'existent or insignif,icant .. :to cthe totality 
of the~·record befo-re the Court;c-.and upon which- it based .. i.ts .. 
decisioh·s. It is simply unpersuasiv_e- _reargument: at bes-t--and 
·:_.,~'"~unabashedly" self serving and selective--ornitting acknowledgemen~. 
of all the facts sup.porting· the_ -Board's decision. 
Specifically: -·-(· 
( 1) As to the argument that the· "special circumstances" 
9Decis ion of May l, 19 84 at p. '4. 
-9-
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reauired for a variance is satisfied by the 3-year period 
~ -
between issuance of the duplex permits and the enforcement 
action. This simply demonstrates Respondent's misunderstand-
. f h . d . . b . f . th . 1 0 ing o t e requirement-- espite prior rie ing on e issue 
and the Court's decision. 11 The Court correctly and speci-
fically held on page 5 that "the property itself contains 
some special circumstances relating to the alleged hardship." 
The Court properly ruled that such circumstances were missing 
in this case. 
(2) Respondent attacks-the Court's statement-that the 
City was not made aware during the application and approval 
process that structure was being used as a dwelling. 
However, it cites·absolutely no authority in the record other 
than the existence of the plat plan showing an existing 
structure. Seeing astructure 0 that,is in position and-a size 
smaller than proposed carports situated on an alley in a 
parking lot (Exhibit D-31) attached to an application 
disclosing there are no dwellings on the lot outlined within 
the project and scope of permit does not equal disclosing the 
use would be for a dwelling. The Court was properly 
persuaded that ambiguous disclosure of an existing building 
which looks and would be legal if it were used as a garage or 
lOAppellant's Brief, pages 25-29. 
1 1necision of May 1, 1984 at pp. 5-6. 
-10-
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storage shed is not equivalent to disclosure of an extra unit 
exceeding the number for which approval was given. 
{3) Respondent suggests there· is no admissible evidence 
to support,; the Court's view that the City, during construc-
tion, had no reason to believe the structure was used as a 
dwelling. Seeing a structure that looks the size, S~?tpe, 
position, characteristic of a garage does not disclose its 
undisclosed use as a dwelling. The testimony of the b9ilding 
inspector that he ... saw· the building "which look~d like an·~:old 
building" provEis·· ·he saw it but doesn't prove he knew or even 
considered it was being :~sed as a dwelling. In·fact, on 
September 30, 1975, it is and wa-s true according to the 
testimony of Mr. - Xanthos· that it was not being so used. 
·Mr. Peguillian's testimony as to the· information he 
received from his· supervisor who was training hill\, was~"-, 
offered as under res gestae"·~excepti.on to the heresay rule. 
It"was admissible· to prove that when''~'inquiring- about the 
.,.,~..-;.,;'struct-ure received} an::,:chi'swer that induced: ·him to believe that 
the building>would be removed.. The statement.,, may or .. ,n:tay·· not 
have been true, perhaps· Mr-. Lawson ,lied· to .. ·Mr·•::' Peguillian. 
But the statement· is significant for it was made by a·-person: 
who· had reaso:ri"'to be familiar with the *project:, who was· in a 
special position of authority to require removal, who would 
have known. the significance it would make· to the· new 
inspector, and ·who knew the action it would" reasonably induce 
-11-
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Mr. Peguillian to forebear. (R-385-389). It does adequately 
support the Court's position. 
Contrary to Respondent's view, the non-heresay testimony 
of Mr. Peguillian that he observed "the older building over 
in the corner, set out there by the alley" (R-388) does not 
suggest he knew or believed it to be used as a dwelling. 
( 4) Respondent errs and confuses the evidence. It 
states Mr. Peguillian first visited the project site in May 
of 1975 (a time Mr. Xanthos testified he occupied the 
structure as a dwelling.) A close reading of the record (R-
385-389) discloses Mr. Peguillian testified he was hired in 
May of 1975. (R-384). Later in July, he received the area 
from Mr. ·Lawson (R-385). The first _time he inspected the 
duplexes was when he went out with Mr. Lawson to do a final-
inspect ion (structural) ._for-a certificate of_ occupancy. His 
initialed date of the inspection was September 30, 1975. (R-
387 and Exhibit 21D-(6). 
(5) The Court did not conclude that the structure was 
not occupied during construction as suggested, _but that- City_ 
inspectors had no reason to believe it was being used as 
dwelling because the-n. they had no reason to believe it was 
not the garage or storage shed it appeared to be. This doe~ 
conform to the record. 
(6) Certificates of occupancy are dated April 23, 1975 
and correspond to the time an owner requests final inspec-
-12-
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tions to begin. Mr. Blair explained in the record inspec-
tions occur upon request after that date, but the 
certificates are not given out until after all final 
inspections have been completed·and the last being the 
building inspection. -·(_Exhibit 23-P and R-223) _ Consequently, 
Mr. Peguillian's testimony is consistent with the documenta-
tion of the record and decision of· this Court. 
(7) Respondent's characterization of the Court's 
statement that the ·s·tructure was never :listed as a residence 
with the City is inaccurate. This Court stated "there was 
evidence that structu:te was never listed as an independent 
residence in the City records, did not have an .:assigned 
address and did not have authorized water, pewer or 
electrical service." That is true~ Exhibit 21-D and 
testimoni.;es of Mr. :B-lair and _Mr. Hafey. 
( 8 l ·! Respondent makes note tha>t.. at court the building 
plans could not be produced by the City but omits noting that 
· ' it couldn,.'t..produce them eith~r, even though it produced old 
bills, tax notices, contracts, etc. related to the property 
and proj.ect. It also '.omits mentioning that the property 
owners did work. without required penni t, removed buildings 
without.permit, and changed .. - tt:ie. ~ddresses it .-p.laced._on t~e. 
units in the field :adding to the confusion in- redords. 
Regardless of the· number of errors al1-eged, they ~are simply 
knit picky and are larg'ely inaccurate. It is simply symptomatic 
-13-
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of Respondent's tenacious unwillingness to accept the fact that 
others, including the Court, can view the facts differently than 
they would like them to. 
Whether considered separately or in their totality, the 
allegations of error are insubstantial, meritless and are much 
ado about notping. The petition for rehearing upon them. should 
be dismissed for what it is--unconvincing reargument. 
POINT II 
REMAND IS NOT NECESSARY, IS CONTRARY TO THE 
INTERESTS OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY. 
As a last-ditch effort to avoid enforcement of the Board's 
decision affirmed by this Court, Respondent begs for-.a~remand. 
The remand is not necessary and is, in light of the detailed 
review of the record by the Court, inappropriate. This is not a 
matter where the trial court has original jurisdiction to weigh 
the evidence in light of its own interpretation of the ordinance 
and public policy. Consequently, the district court has no 
unique function that -cannot and --has not been performed by the 
Supreme Court. The decision is final, and should remain so. In 
the interest of judicial economy, the parties and courts should 
-be spared of unnecessary additional burdens. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent's petition is completely based on issues and· 
facts already correctly considered by this Court. Basically, it 
reechoes the concern of the dissenting opinion. At best, it is 
-14-
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blatantly repitious self serving reargument that did not 
prevail. The supposed errors cited as the grounds for rehearing 
either aren't errors at all or are completely insignificant 
minutia. 
The principal holdings on the law are not objected to 
directly. Respondent instead objects to the proper application 
of them by the Supreme Court. There is no other body better able 
to conduct the limited appellate review in light of the appro-
priate standards this Court has established. 
There is nothing in the petition which gives any valid 
reason to consider the Court's decision. Therefore, the 
appellant believes the petition should be dismissed, that the 
significant, well-reasoned decision by the Court of May 1, 1984 
should be affirmed to provide guidance to the district courts of 
this state to avoid future error. 
Respectfully submitted this c::L( day of June, 1984. 
cm90 
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